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Introduction' 
In this paper I shall try to describe how Norwegian foreign policy was shaped in 
the area where British and Gennan interests converge .. As an introduction I shall 
examine the years from 1905 until the outbreak of the Second World War. 
The postwar reconstruction of Europe' was of course very much in the 
minds of the exile governments in London. I shall try to give some insight into 
Norwegian planning. However, plans cannot always be carried out in the face of 
reality. Reality forced Norway to resort to the so-called bridgebuilding-policy. 
After a short account of ~ridgebuilding, the presentation focuses on the stress and 
strain on this policy by international deveiopment,. and the challenges from 
initiatives such as tl1e Marshall speech, thoughts of a Nordic Union and the 
conception of a so-ca'lled Third Alternative. Finally the study concentrates on.the 
Schuman Plan and on how Nprway's dependence on Great Britain affected her 
appraisements. . . . 
One may argue that a study about "Postwar Reconstruction.and Readjust-
ment: 1945 -1951" should not take 1905 as a point of departure. Where Norway 
is concerned there are at least two main arguments for doing so. First, as Norway 
is a small countrj on th,e outer rim of the European continent, we cannot assume 
that her traditions and evaluatio!1S in the planning and shaping of foreign policy are 
well knoWll~Secondly,and this is essential, Norway's reactions, or rather lack of 
reactionS to the postwar collapse of Geimany and her inc~ed dependence on the 
UK market, deUiched frOm its historical context, could leave your audience just as 
wise as they were. To !llticipate one of my main conclusions - Norw;ay's lack of 
interest and reactions, although not totally absent, may be explained and 
understood in the light of this Atlantic nation's feeling of distance to the European 
continent from thefrrst day of her independence, 
** .. 
Nils A. Rehne is a graduate in history from the University of Oslo. Rehne has done research into 
the relationship between Norway and Europe in the twentieth century . 
. i· 
1 
From unspoken to outspoken alliance 
From the day on which Norway obtained her independence from Sweden in 1905, 
"neutralism, non-alignment and a strong taint of isolationism"', were main features 
of her foreign policy. This new state on the northern periphery of Europe tried in 
many respects to follow the words of her great national poet, Bjmnstjeme 
Bjmnson. According to Bjmnson, Norway's foreign policy should be "to have no 
policy whatever". And it is not carrying. things too far to say that the main task, 
when we speak about Norway's foreign policy ambitions, was, from the beginning, 
to place international trade and shipping under surveillance. 
And foreign trade was important for the Norwegian economy. About 30 per 
cent of her gross national product was exported - one-third of this export was 
income from shipping. In the First years; immediately after 1905 both commodity 
export (and import) and the shipping industry were growing.' Norway became 
more and more dependent on her traderelations with other countries and interested 
in international free trade, where a growing demand for chartering could bring an 
increasing Norwegian shipping tonnage into operation. (This Norwegian interest 
in a free trade policy, in contras1l1i!!l the Swedish wish to use trade protection 
measures to protect her industry~iS;0ii::n mentioned as an important motive behind 
the dissolution of the union betweem the two countries.) 
Within a decade after indepeml'ence Norway's f9reign policy was put to a 
severe test. Her policy during the:l!iilsUWorld War was to remain non-aligned and 
neutral, but to continue trading, Yd. both Germany and Great Britain under the 
rules of contraband of war. This, Wll5Ji11i) easy task for a young nation that had tried 
from the very start to follow the:wm*of Jmgen l0vland (Norway's first Minister 
of F oreign Affairs) "Looking at atema1 relations, it is always being said with 
much force: We want no foreip poI'iii:y.. '" 
Norway managed to stay out €lithe First World War, not so much because 
, Olav Risle (ed.), Weat"", &Curil]!. Tile' FOI"mative Years, "Was 1949 a Turning Point? 
Norway and The Western Powers 1941-1950", p. 129. 
, Berge Furre, Our century (Vdrt 6rhuntlre), NOI"slc HlstOl"ie 190:5-1990, p. 34. 
, Parliamentary Record 1905 - 1906 (Slortingsforhandlinger 1905 -1906), pp. 45 - 46. 
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of her own policy, but because the beIligerents on the whole, to quote Sir 
Mansfeldt Findlay,the British Minister in Christiania, judged that "the risks of 
converting Norway.into an ally were greater than the benefits which could be 
expected from a foothold in Scandinavia. '" But during the war the real extent of 
Norway's political, economic and strategic dependence on Great Britain was 
underlined. And during Norway's official neutrality we can find a sympathy for the 
Entente and in many respects an acceptance of its economic warfare against 
Ge~y. This anti~German feeling was fuelled by the loss Norway suffered both 
of human lives and merchant ships because of Germany's unrestricted submarine 
warfare. Apparently pro-British sentiments were stronger and pro-German 
sentiments weaker in Norway than in any other of the neutral European states.' 
The war nourished both Norwegian scepticism against Germany and 
continental EUrope and the feeling of an unspoken alliance with Great Britain. This 
gave impetus to the almost anti-European frame of mind that was an integrated 
part of NorWay's general foreign policy from the day of independence. Facts oflife 
had so far confirmed the words of Wedel Jarlsberg (Norwegian ambassador to 
Paris from 1906 until 1930) in 1905 to Prime Minister Christian Michelsen: "In my 
opinion there is no doubt, we have to adhere to England - we are not fitted to bear 
dictate and orders from Germany.'" 
There were also economic reasons for this unspoken alliance. In 1920 
Britain stood unrivalled as NorWay's most important trading partner: about one-
third of Norway's trade' was with Britain, while Germany, as the second most 
important trading partner, accounted for one-tenth of both import and export. As 
the table of value of imports and exports show this was going to change 
considerably during the interwar period. 
• Olav Riste, The neutral al/y, London 1965, p. 217 .. 
, Ulf Anderues, England or Germany (England eller Tysk/and), Thesis in History, University 
of Oslo, 1976. p. 182. 
, Roald Berg, "The country we expect help from" ("Det land vi venter hj81lp ar') 
Forsvarsstudier IV, 1985, p. 128. . 
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Table I: Value of imports and exports 1931-1939 
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Exports: 
Great 27,6 25,7 20,4 24,2 24,1 23,7 25,1 24,6 24,1 
Britain 
Gennany 11,6 12,3 12,5 13,6 13,0 13,1 13,0 15,4 14,5 
Imports: 
Great 20,3 21,5 22,8 22,8 17,8 17,7 18,2 17,2 17,8 
Britain 
Gennany 23,0 21,3 21,0 19,1 17,0 17,6 17,9 18,4 19,0 
All the figures are in per cent of the total export/import. From the year 1938 the figure for 
Germany also includes Austria. In the years before 1938 the figures for Austria have little or 
no significance for the total export/import picture. 
In 1939 the import figures show that 19 per cent of Norway's import came 
from Germany and Austria This was 2.2 per cent more than from Britain. 
Regarding export Britain was still the main market for Norwegian products.7 
The Norwegian answer to the international development between the two 
World Wars was to continue a foreign policy, in common with the other Nordic 
states, where preservation of their neutralist stand and the avoidance of 
entanglements in great power disputes were central features. Norway's reluctant 
entry into the League of Nations does not modifY this conclusion. It was "an 
expression of a non-binding and harmless alignment with Western powers"', and 
the later withdrawal from the League's sanctions paragraph underlined her 
neutralist stand. Seen against this background it is not surprising that the 
Norwegian reaction to Aristide Briand's project of a European federal union in 
1929-30 was to show "the greatest possible reservation". Symptomatically Norway 
7 Historical Statistics (Historisk stalislikk), Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway, 1978. 
• Olav Riste, "Isolasjonisme og stonnaktsgarantiar", Forsvarsstudier No. 3, 1991, p. 9. 
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called into question the use of the concept of Europe ~ suitable in disCussions 
about schemes of cooperation, and Norway's adherence to Britain surfaced as she 
asked if the British Empire were going to be included in Briand's union.' 
The Briand discussion revealed that Norwegian interest in continental 
European cooperation was limited to the economic field. This, of cOurse, reflects 
Norway's heavy dependence on foreign trade. And of the so-called Oslo 
convention between the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, initiated by the 
,Norwegian Prime Minister, Mowinckel, Norway (and the othefsmaIl states of 
Europe) tried to promote a free trade policy. 10 On the whole Churchill's motto for 
the British people during the First World War can be used to characterise 
NOrWegianforeign policy after the same \V8[': "Business carried on as usual during 
alterations on the map ofEurope".H .. 
But after the outbreak of the SecOlid World. War and after the Gennan 
attack on Norway it was iiripossible to continue "business as usual", And Norway's 
relationship with. Great aritain was changing from an unspoken to an outspoken 
alliance. The Norwegian scepticism to Gennany and to continental Europe, in spite 
of important economic ties, was reaffinned. ' 
From the ninth of April' 1940 there was no further need for for "smooth 
manoeuvering" by Norway betWeen the United Kingdom and Gennany. The 
following postwar collapse of Gennany and the in~reaseddependence on the UK 
market did not in itSelf create arty noticeable unrest in Norway. And as shown 
below, it was the introduction of the Schuman Plan, and later in the same year the 
Pleven Plan, that again challenged the Norwegian distance to the European 
continent and Gennany. 
'Nils A. Rehne, NOIwegian Attitudes Towards tbe Briand Plan, Forsvarsstudier No 8 - 1991, 
10 Ger van Roon, Small States in years of depression. The Oslo alliance 1930 - 1940, Van 
Gorcum, The Netherlands, 1989, p. 8. 
11 Churchill, Complete Speeches (1974). vol. 3, Speech at tbeGuildhall, 9 Nov. 1914, p. 2341. 
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A Hitlerite view of Europe? 
In November 1941, the new Norwegian Foreign Minister, TrygveLie, wrote an 
article in The Times, where he introduced the so-called AtlaI1tic Policy. This policy 
was confirmed by the Norwegian government in May 1942 in the important 
document "The principal features of Norway's foreign policy": 
''After the war, Norway will be economically impoverished, and we shall need 
immediate supplies offood and raw materials and also capital of our means of 
production ... we shall have to co-operate in the first instance with other Atlantic 
countries. From the cultural point of view, Norway feels herself strongly attached 
to the democracies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ... 
Until it becomes possible to cnate an effective and universal League of 
Nations, Norway will be compelled to seek security in regional arrangements. 
Norway therefore, desires binding and' obligatory military agreements concer-
ning the defence of the North Atlantic;. and she is anxious that Sweden should be 
a party to these agreements. The Norwegian Government would also look with 
satisfaction upon the adhesion of Denmark, the Netherlands. Belgium and France 
to the system. An attempt should also be' made, during the war, to create the basis 
for economic co-operatioll1 IJetwee1T the western democracies, which is the 
primary condition of internalfunal' economic co-operation. Norway is, therefore, 
greatly interested in internatimuzl co-operation in regard to shipping ... ". 
Just as clearly as the Norwegian government recommended Atlantic co-operation 
in "The principal features", it was negative to continental arrangements. The 
document paid lip-service to the proposal oh "United States of Europe" with the 
formulation:" ... Norway will be greatly interested after the war in developing 
economic and cultural relations with the c,ontinent of Europe ... ". But although 
Germany was not mentioned the comment m connection with continental alliances 
left no room for misunder- standing: "A continental alliance would ... lead sooner 
or later to the complete dependence of the' small countries of We stem Europe upon 
the strongest continental power."" 
"The Labour Movement's Archives (LMA) (Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv), Oslo, Finn Moe's 
Archives, "The principal features of Norway's foreign policy" - 8 May -1942. 
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The relation to Gennany was particularly mentidned later in the document: 
"The question for Norway, as well as for the other Allies, is to create security 
against any future Gennan aggression. Thefust demand must be the complete and 
controlled disarmament of Germany. For Norway it is of special importance that 
Germany shall have no opportunity to possess a navy and an air force. We, like our 
Allies,are interested in creating economic and social stability in Germany as the 
basis for a future Gennan democracy. Forthe rest, relations with Germany, in the 
period immediately following the war; Will depend om the internal development 
in Germany herself." 
The emphasis on "The principal features" is well-founded. Here we find the 
. expression of the Norwegian attitudes stemming from 1905, the same attitudes that 
were going to colour the Norwegian posture towards European integration schemes 
after the Second World War too. The document tells us that Norway was a very 
lukewarm European, and the "distance" to the continent can largely be found in 
Noiwegianjudgements about Gennany and German policy. Under the pressure of 
the war this attitude of scepticism could slide into a kind of Europhobia. As a 
reaction to a British Pamphlet called "Relief and reconstruction in Europe. The 
first steps", six of the foremost advisers to the Norwegian government in exile in 
London drew up a document titled "Europe sHould not be treated as a unit". To I,Ise 
the conception "Europe", Without an explicit statement that the British Isles was 
"an integral arid important part of it", was to accept a "Hitlerite view", according 
to the Norwegians. 13 
The postwar collapse of Germany and increased dependence on the UK 
market therefore coincided with Norway's foreign policy priorities and ideas about 
regional and universal cooperation in the postwar era. 
On the eve of the Second World War Knut Getz-Wold, prominent adviser 
in the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, gave lectures and wrote about international 
aspects of Norwegian economic reconstruction. He underlined that Britain would 
have to play a leading role in all international relief and reconstruction, and he 
emphasised the fact that the economic life of Britain and Norway had "an 
outstanding feature in common: the prosperity and economic well-being of both 
countries is completely dependent on their international connections. n 
13 LMA, Aake Anker Ording's Archives, Box 8, 1942 . 
. 
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He mentioned of course the central role of Britain as Norway's largest 
supplier and customer, with Germany as second on the list of Norway's most 
important trading partners. (The figures for Britain were: 23 per cent of total 
import and 28 per cent of total export in 1938. Corresponding figures for Germany 
in the same year were 17 and 16 per cent respectively, according to Getz-Void.) 
But it is a notable fact that he did not express any great concern for the 
consequences for Norwegian economy in general, given Germany's evident 
reduced role as a trading partner for Norway in the early postwar years. However, 
in two areas of primary importance for the Norwegian economy in the recon-
struction period, he did sound a little uneasy. Given the development in production 
of coal, and taking into account the postwar needs in Britain herself and the export 
capacities of Poland. and Germany, Norway "might encounter considerable 
difficulties in securing the necessary imports of coal." Besides this important 
question of energy Norway was very interested in "a speedy rebuilding of her fleet 
after the war". Considering the fact that Germany had built about 25 per cent of 
Norway's mercantile marine in the six years before the war, the question was 
where Norway was to have new ships built to replace those she had lost." 
However Norwegian reflections on postwar Europe and postwar economy 
did not focus particularly on the economic consequences of the German collapse. 
This does not suggest that Norwegian politicans did not have some understanding 
of the significance of Germany in the total European economic picture. A clear 
majority in the Norwegian decision-making bodies realized that total economic 
disarmament of Germany could mean a serious loss for European economy as a 
whole. Most of them would probably endorse the view from a conference on 
reconstruction in Europe (The Fabian International Bureau Conference on March 
17th and 18th 1945) where among others the director in the Norwegian Office of 
Foreign Affairs, Aake Anker Ording, participated: " ... if the needs of Europe are 
to be satisfied in the immediate postwar years, there is a vast potential of plant and 
labour in Germany which can be used to supply it. To suggest, therefore, that the 
people of Europe would prefer poverty to insecurity is to pose a false alternative. 
There is no reason why they should not have both prosperity and security, since 
neither is possible without the other, as was recognised in the Atlantic charter. 
J4 Knut Getz-Vold, "International aspects of Norwegian economic reconstruction", 
international Affairs, Vol.XX, No.I, January 1944, pp. 54 - 67. 
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The ~olicy of bridgebuilding 
The absence on the Norwegian ~genda of discussion of the eco~omic importance 
ofGennany, was due in no small part to .the .overall foreign policy line and strategy 
. chosen by Norway after the war. Thispolicy was named bridgebuilding. During 
the latter years of the Second World War the major allied powers gave priority to 
the United Nations. Norway shelved her "Atlantic policy" and fell back upon a 
policy resembling the foreign policy from the interwar years. 
The intention of avoiding involvement ill international tensions and 
conflicts together .with the widespread belief and awareness. of Norway's Atlantic 
falicback position were central.elements in the basis of bridge building-policy , as 
they had been in Norway's policy of neutrality in the interwar years. In this respect 
bridgebUilding, firrfro!Il be~g new, was a paraphrase of a well-known theme in 
Norwegian foreign policy stemming from the day of independence in 1905. 
The Norwegian rese~her Nils Morten Udgaard gives the following 
definition ()f bridgebuilding in his central. work '!Great Power Politics .and 
Norwegian Foreign Policy": 
* 
* 
* 
Norway should not enter into binding political and military agreements 
with aliy particular countries. 
She should not burden the international system by introducing new 
complications. 
Norway should avoid action which might be interpreted as throwing doubt 
upon her impartiality towards, and her independence of, the Great Powers. 
In addition to these negative aspects of bridgebuilding, Udgaard also manages to 
identify some "positive actions resulting from the Govermnent's policy". But he 
underlines that no 'bridges' were built; bridgebuilding retained a declatory 
character, however, the Govermnent tried to make it operational as following: 
* 
* 
Norway should diversifY her economic and cultural relations geographi-
cally between Eastern and Western Europe. 
She should contribute to. the development of habits and techniques of 
international cooperation. . 
9 
'" 
'" 
Norway should strengthen her own defence and support measures which 
strengthened the international system. 
At home, Norway should develop a social system, a nuddle way of a third 
force between capitalism and communism." 
Norway embarked on the postwar era with this policy of bridge building, realizing 
that wartime cooperation between the Great Powers was bound to continue. Thus 
the main foreign policy aim was to support universal co-operation between all 
nations in the world, and discourage the establishment of regional groupings, 
especially regional groupings with a continental European flavour. Because as 
Finn Moeput it in the article "European Federation" in the. governmental 
newspaper Norsk Tidend: "From a Norwegian point of view the thought of a 
European Federation ... (without) ... Great Britain and Russia will mean the same 
as to surrender Europe to the strongest power on the continent, to Germany."'· 
Given Germany's importance for Norwegian economy in the latter years 
before the Second World War, one would expect this topic to occupy a more 
prominent position in the Norwegian foreign policy-making process. But as we 
have shown above, from 1905 on Norway kept Germany and continental Europe 
at a distance. And the war itself and the early postwar years, with a foreign policy 
based on bridgebuilding, did not foster an environment where long-term ecomomic 
thinking, focused on Germany, prevailed over main foreign policy preferences. 
"Nils Morten Udgaard, "Great Power Politic. and Norwegian Foreign Policy", University 
Press, Oslo 1973, pp. 192 - 194. 
I. Nor.k Tidend, 2213 - 44. Finn Moe was a serious candidate for the position of Norwegian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs after the war. He was a central person in the foreign policy 
discussions in Norway, and one of the few decision-makers who developed a more positive 
attitude towards European cooperation after the war. 
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Does Norway belong to Western Europe? 
. . 
Does NorWay belong t~ We~tern Europe? This question w8s asked by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, during the discussions on a permanent 
European economic organization, in connection with the Paris conference about 
. theMarshall Plan." It was the injtiative from George Marshall on 5th June 1947 
that compelled Norway to contrast the foreign policy of bridge building withher 
foreign economic policy. The result of this appraisement was that Norway, to 
ensure both prosperity and security had to join this Western initiative, but at the 
same time she feared it to be the embryo of a Western bl!lc. That is why Norway 
hesitated, and hesitated for such a long time. that Dalton ,asked his distressing 
question. 
It was notonly the threat tobridgebuilding-policy, as such, that motivated 
the Norwegian reluctance. This was probably the, main obstacle to a whole-hearted 
Norwegian rally round the Marshall initiative,but the Marshallinitiative and the 
ensuing negotiations in Paris were fraught with other important faults ,from a 
Norwegian point of view. In thelater historical debates therebas been a discussion 
. about the American motives behind the Marshall initiative. What was the 
American long-range policy? The historian John Gimbel maintains that the 
Marsha1l Plan was almost exclusively motivated by.an American wish to rebuild 
Germany as fast as possible: 18 
John L. Gaddis asserts that "the whole point of the Marshall Plan had been 
to restore self-confidence, so that Europe would be in a position to defend itself."" 
To achieve this supposed, in one way or another, that Europe could make full use 
of the German potential, without allowing Germany to get the upper hand in 
Europe. The answer to this dilemma was to further plans about European 
integration. Apart from the belief in the pure economic rationale of European 
17 Helge 13. Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction", Scandinavian Journal of History, 
1,1976. p. 151. 
18 John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, Stanford 1976, p. 275. 
" Op.cit., note I, p. 68: 
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integration, this more superior political appraisement of the situation was the 
background for the American insistence on a permanent European organisation to 
coordinate and administrate the programme of aid following the Marshall 
initiative. As Alan S. Millward puts it in his work "The Reconstruction of West em 
Europe": "The United States did not only intend to reconstruct Western Europe 
economically, but also Politically. "'" 
Norwegian politicans were keenly interested in the motives behind the 
Marshall Plan. It is symptomatic that at a meeting of the cooperation committee 
for Nordic social democrats at the beginning of February 1948, where the leaders 
from all the Nordic countries, participated, Erik Brofoss (Norwegian Finance 
Minister) strongly disagreed wiIenJ ErDst Wigfors (Sweden) argued that it was not 
necessary at this stage to speculate over the American motives. "I can't agree ... 
that we don't need to discuss the motivation behind the Marshall Plan. Our attitude 
to the plan is dependent on the Americarn motives ... ", said Brofoss.2I 
And like the historians:aliJove, the-Norwegians were more or less aware of 
the mixed motives behind tile- Marshall Plan, and their unrest did not, as 
. mentioned, orginate merely firam cOllcem about the bridgebuilding-policy. The 
American claims and the negliltfutfulilS indicated a form of European continental 
integration with a prominentpJam,for6ermany. There was no guarantee that the 
cooperation would not develillp> im adWI:raI direction. . 
We find further traees; dN0nway's virtually anti-European and anti-
German attitudes in her figl!at tm> giiIIe the UN-based organisation, Economic 
Commission for Europe, EC1B'~ III poomiilent operating position in. the European 
Recovery Program (ERP); Tinsdligmttwaslost in the beginning of September 1947 
when Britain changed hermiBdl.. 
20 Alan s. Millward, The Reconstruction'o/Western Europe - 1945 -1951, London 1984, p. 
57. 
21 LMA, Nordic Co-operation Committee, minutes of meetings 7 and 8 February 1948. 
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Nordic Union - a third alternative - UNISCAN 
In the wake of the Marshall Plan and during the following discussions two other 
conceptions aroused some interest in the Norwegian political debate. These were 
the proposal of a Nordic custom union and the idea of a so-called "third 
altemative", between American capitalism and Russian communism. 
The question of a Nordic customs union had been touched onjust after the 
end of the Second World War.12 The Marshall Plan and the American attempt to 
promote regional European cooperation, led to the establishment of a Scandinavian 
study group. But the work in the study group soon revealed Norwegian scepticism. 
The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs voiced Norway's feelings about the 
. project with the following words: " ... the Danish govemment considered that this 
would make a good impression in the United States ... "" That the proposal ofa 
Nordic customs union came about in order to pay lip service to a general Nordic 
sceptical attitude towards the American claim of European cooperation, was also 
confirmed by the Danish Minister of Commerce, Jens Otto Ktag, in February 
1948. At a meeting of Nordic social democrats he admitted that the Nordic 
countries, not least Norway, were sceptical to a Nordic custom union, but the work 
"made at least a good impression in the United States".24 
. The idea that is known as the "third alternative" gave rise to just as much, 
if not more, interest in Norway than the question of a Nordic customs union. 
MarshaIl's speech in June 1947, and especially the British Foreign Minister Bevin's 
famous speech in January 1948, gave impetus to this idea in Norway, particularly 
within the governing Labour party. The third alternative was seen in a Norwegian 
context to be British-dominated cooperation among the social democratic regimes 
in North-West Europe, in the economic, cultural and political-ideological fields. 
This differed from the continental,federative solutions." The idea of a Britih-Ied 
confederate cooperation lying betWeen American capitali~JD and Russian 
22 Ibid., note 16, p. I SO. 
" Ibid., note 18, p. 145. 
"Ibid., note 22, p. S. 
25 Nils A. Rshne, ''Norway - a lukewarm European", Forsvarsstudier, No. 7-1986. 
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communism attracted Norway, and. at the, same time cooperation within this 
framework corresponded to a certain degree with Norwegian scepticism to 
. continental Europe IIIld Germany. 
This conception of a "third alternative"around Great Britain was strengthe-
ned by Norway's postwar external economic)inks. Norwegian politiclUlswere 
aware that.the war had increased Norway's dependence on the outside world, 
particularly on the Atlantic nations. At the same time Germany became a 
negligible trading partner in the early postwar years. An estimation made in 1947 
of countries that replaced imports from Germany gives the following list: Great 
Britain - 44%, USA - 28%, Belgium, France and the Netherlands - 22%, rest of the 
world - 6%.26 If we add the following figures from e.g. the year 1948 to the above, 
. showing Norwegian figures for import and export from countries with a share from 
5% and higher - Great Britain - 18% and 16%, Syvec1en - 13% and 9"10, USA - 13% 
and 8%, Be-ne-Iux - 7% and 10%, Denmark - 5% I;llld 6%, France. 4,5% and 7%" 
- we can conclude that Norway, in the economic field, was closelyiinked to 
countries intheAtlantic and North-West European area. And once again Norway 
did not feel any discomfort in this situation. 
This is not to say that Germany and the German economic potential was 
not contemplated at all. For those who studied Norwegian import and export 
statistics in more detail, it was not difficult to fmd remnants from the important 
position of Germany before the Wlll", and omens about a future comeback after the 
immediate reconstruction period. In 1948 the American and British zones in 
Germany took delivery of Norwegian fish amounting .to 15 per cent of the 
Norwegian total export. This was almost the same share as that of Great Britain, 
and no other market approached these figures. ·(Here I succumb ,to the temptation 
to remind you that in. the discussions now proceeding concerning Norway's 
membership in EEC, the significance. of continental Europe as .a market for 
Norwegian fishing products is one of the main areas of discussiop..) 
The commodity group with the highest share of total Norwegian export 
when we speak about the trade between Norway and the Anglo-American zones, 
was ores and slag. The zones stood in a class alone with a share amounting to 27 
"Ibid. note 16, pp. 168 -169. 
"Statistical Yearbook 1950, pp. 140 _ 141. Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway. 
14 
. per cent of the total of this commodity group. But ores and slag represented only 
2 per cent of the total. Norwegian export in 1948. For fuel, lubricating oils etc, 
(especially coal) the zones supplied Norway with 7 per cent, being number four on 
the list of important suppliers, after Poland, Great Britain and the United States." 
Expectations of a significant German contribution to the economic revival of 
Europe were at the basis of such statements as the following given by the director 
of the Norwegian national bank, Gunnar Jahn, in winter 1948: " ... that Germany 
again starts to produce ... is the only way the Germans can contribute their share 
to compensate for the devastations they brought about. "29 
The opinion that a recovery of the small nation's economy was a question 
of a European recovery, and that a European recovery again was dependent on a 
German recovery, led the Norwegian representative at the Paris conference on the 
Marshall Plan, in July 1947, to speak "in favour of an accelerated German recovery 
and ... wider consultations with the smaller powers about policy in Germany ... ". 
But at the same time Norway insisted'.'on restrictions being maintained in those 
areas which competed directly with Norwegian interests, fishing, whaling, 
. shipping and shipbuilding ... ".]. 
But in this connection there was one big question that needed a satisfactory 
reply: If the Germans were allowed to develop their resources, how could one 
hinder the industrial and economic potential from furnishing the country with a 
platform from which they would dominate or try to dominate Europe? 
But in spite of these misgivings concerning Germany, Norway on the 
whole felt quite comfortable with herWestem economical ties. In 1948 Norway 
even raised the question of more organized Scandinavian-British economic 
cooperation." Britain pursued the idea as she tried to balance the French proposal 
of a continental European payment union, FINEBEL." 
" Ibid. note 28, pp. 138 - 14 J. 
2' Hans Petter Hennansen, From .'a'e o/war 10 alliance (Fra Icrigslilsland lil al/ianse), 
University Press, Oslo 1980. p. 19. 
]. Alan S. Milward, The REconstruclion o/WeslemEurope 1945 -1951, London 1984, p. 72. 
" Ibid., p. 3 I 6. 
" Ibid. , pp. 306 - 3 I 8. 
15 
In the middle of December 1949 UNISCAN was established, but like her 
continental counterpart, FINEBEL, the committee never became a significant 
forum for economic cooperation . 
. Nevertheless the Norwegian membership in UNISCAN at the end of the 
1940s was a confirmation of Norwegian policy valid through the whole decade: 
Norway was, economically, dependent on and closely bound up with Britain, and 
she was even willing to strengthen these economic ties through the establishment 
of regional groups for economic cooperation, It is tempting to go so far as to say 
that Norway had only one main claim to make in this connection: the groups 
should not have a continental, say German, featore. 
Norway arid the Schuman Plan 
Eightdays before Robert Schuman read outhis proposal in May 1950 "that the 
entire French-German production of coal and steel be. placlx! under a High 
Authority, within an organisation open to the participation of other European nati-
ons"",' Finn Moe, then chairman' in the. Foreign Affairs Committee in the 
Norwegian parliament, had a comprehensive foreign policy article in the 
Goveniment's mouthpiece,· Arbeiderbladet. When he mentioned the European 
situation he wrote that ''Norway ... is to a high degree dependent on the economic 
arid political developinentin Europe ... the most important and most difficult 
question in Europe is beyo~d doubt the relationsliiplo Germany. Itis the same old 
question: How can Germany resume its' old position in European economy and 
participate in the European political cooperation without being more powerful than 
the rest of Europe and thus be 'a danger for them?"" . ' . 
"Ibid. note 31, p. 397. 
"Arbeiderbladet, 1.5.50. 
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In his memoirs the Gennan chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, gives Robert Schuman 
honourable mention: "In the morning I was still unaware that this day would bring 
the news about a decisive turning point in Europe's development. "lS As we know 
it was by no means any new idea the French foreign minister proposed on 9th May 
1950. This was a variant of a well-known theme - the internationalization of the 
Ruhr, but this time dressed in European clothing. One of the main objectives was 
to create a European framework in which French security was consistent with 
German reconstruction. 
Norway did not recieve any invitation from the French government to the 
conference following the initiative from Robert Schurnan, but Great Britain did! 
There are grounds for presuming that Norway did not regard with disfavour the 
British refusal to participate at the conference. The fIrst Norwegian reactions also 
revealed, not surprisingly, that Norway was equal to Great Britain in her 
judgements about the Schurnan Plan. 
Norway was sceptical of the ()vemational character of the plan and stressed,· 
like Britain, that European cooperation should be cooperation between responsible 
governments.'6 Norway disliked the idea that European cooperation should go 
beyond traditional international cooperation between sovereign states. 
In parliament the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, emphasised 
the political importance ofSchuman's initiative: "The Schurnan Plan came first and 
foremost into existence as a result of political considerations"." In the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs the political considerations were expressed as follows: The aim 
was to eliminate the old contrasting relationship between France and Germany and 
lay the foundation of a political union in Western Europe. 
lS Hans Hoffinann, Opening of the public records of the European Communities historical 
archives, Germany 1983, p.12. 
J6 UD (UD=Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Bind 11, Norway and the relation to the Coal and 
Steel Community - report dated 11 October 1954, p. 5; VD, 52.2123, Bind I, Report dated 19 
June 1950; Stortingslidende (parliamentary records) 7b 1950, p. 1722. 
" Slortingstidende 7b, p. 1721 
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Even more importantly, the incorporation of the coal and steel industry of Western 
Germany into a European organisation would be an effective way to cement West 
Germany to the Atlantic powers and thereby prevent a German orientation towards 
the east." 
The first Norwegian reactions to the. Schuman Plan were a kind of 
adaptation of the initiative into the pattern of cooperation Norway preferred: the 
economic, military and political potential of West Germany had to be utilised, not 
to shape a European bloc, but to strengthen Western Europe as a part of the 
Atlantic community. This "Atlantic" approach to the understanding of the 
Schurnan initiative was not confirmed by the British decision not to participate in 
the subsequent conference. Britain was the necessary link between the continent 
and the Anglo-Atlantic world and the guarantee for European cooperation 
developed within an Atlantic.frame. 
But this did not trouble Norway. On the contrary, it was in the best interests 
of Norway, given the strong economic ties between the two countries, that Great 
Britain did not participate-in a future coal and steel community. And the comments 
from Norwegian quarters probably resulted not so much from genuine interest, as 
an effect of foreign policy obligations - it was almost impossible to let the 
Schuman initiative pass uncommented. The fact that Norway followed the 
negotiations in Paris with very little interest lends .force to my argument. In the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs there were doubts whether the negotiations in Paris 
would result in anything at all." After the agreement was reached between the six, 
Norway's ambassador in Paris was still sceptical about the outcome of the whole 
process, as he predicted problems in the ratification .... 
However, on 25th July 1952 the treaty came into force. The Coal and Steel 
Community was a reality, and this seems to have increased Norwegian attention 
and interest. Now the focus in Norway was changed from broadly viewed 
appraisals to the more concrete economic consequences for Norway. The Coal and 
" UD, 52.2123, Bind I. 
"UD, 52.2/23, Bind I, Report about the Schuman Plan, dated 19 June 1950 . 
... UD 52.2123, Bind 4, Reports from Ambassador RoIf Andvord dated 21 March and 19 April 
1951. 
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Steel Community would influence the Norwegian economy particulary in the 
following areas: 
... Norway would be faced by a import monopoly in her iron ore export. 
... The import of iron and steel could be made difficult because of the strong 
position of the Coal and Steel community as an export monopoly. 
... Difficulties could arise regarding supplies of coal to Norway." 
One would have expected that the slight signs of unrest about the consequences in 
economic sectors involving coal, iron and steel should have been stronger, taking 
into consideration the ambitious national development projects - not least the 
Norwegian steel work in the north of Norway, in Mo i Rana. 
This was an essential part of the governing Labour party's total industrial 
policy, a policy staked on industries that could replace expensive imports and earn 
foreign currency. 42 A corollary of this would be to give close attention to the 
development of Norway's export markets, and as shown in the table below West 
Germany's significance in this respect was growing. 
In all there were good reasons for following the development closely, and 
in retrospect Norway's reactions seem very cautious. The Norwegian interest so far 
could, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be defended in GAIT and 
OEEC. But in the long view this was considered insufficient, and at the beginning 
of ·1953 the Norwegian government appointed a permanent delegation to the 
ECSC, because of "the economic and political importance of the Coal and Steel 
Community".4] 
41 VD, 522123, Report about the Schuman Plan dated June 1952. 
42 Tore Gmnlie, The main industrial policy line (Den industripolitis/ce hovedlinje) inTrond 
Bergh (eel.), Growth and prosperity (Vekst og VelSland), Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1981, p. 
102. 
41 UD, 52.2123, Address to Government dated 19.2 1953. 
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Table 2: Norways exports aluJ imports from 1946-1954 
1946 1947 19.48 1949 1950 1951 1951 1953 . 1954 
, 
, 
, 
, , 
" 
Exports: 
" 
Great 10,3 14,5 15,8 18,1 18,1 19,9 20,1 19,5 19,1 
Britain 
Gennany 5,3 2,7 ,5,4, 6,4 11,2 7,6 8,7 ·9,1 10,2 
Imports: 
, 
Great 19,3 19,3 ,18,3 21,3 22,1 23,0 20,0 .21,0 20,2 
Britain 
Gennany 5,6 1,8 2,7 3,1 4,1 6,7 '11,1 16,0 ' 15,2 
The figures are per cent of the total export/import for each year; From'1949 the 
figures shows the export/import from West Germany. 
Norway's reactions as Jean Monnet invites Great Britain 
to join ECSC 
Three and a half years after Robert Schurnan's famous speech, and a year and ahalf 
after the ECSC became operative, Norway really had to put her relationship to the 
ECSC on the agenda. The reason for this was the invitation from the High 
Authority, by its president Jean Monnet, to Britain, with the purpose of 
establishing a closer connection between Britain and the Coal and Steel 
Community. Jean Monnet's initiative brought about Norwegian reactions which 
underline how closely Norway was following Britain in her European policy, and 
indicate that Norway's dependence on Britain influenced strongly her policy also 
vis-a-vis the Coal and Steel Community.44 
44 VD, 52.2123, Bind 8, Report about the Coal and Steel Community, 6.4 1954, p. 3. 
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Jean Monnet's invitation to Britain opened up new possibilities for British 
membership in the ECSC. This, combined with an inquiry from the British to the 
Norwegian government on what Norway's position would be if Britain joined the 
ECSC, induced Norway to appoint a committee with the task of investigating 
economic and commercial problems in the event of Norwegian cooperation with 
the ECSC." Simultaneously the Norwegian ambassador to OEEC in Paris 
approached the High Alithority in the ECSC to clarify whether Norway could enter 
into negotiations along the same lines mapped out by president Monnet in the case 
of Great Britain. The answer from the High Authority was negative." 
This opened a very undesirable scenario for Norway. If the negotiations 
between Great Britain and the ECSC, succeeded Norway would be faced by a 
British-Continental common market for coal and steel. In a discussion with the 
British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden his Norwegian counterpart, Halvard 
Lange, mentioned the Norwegian unrest in this matter. Eden's answer reassured the 
Norwegians suitably: Primarily - "Her Majesty's Government has not yet reached 
a conclusion on the reply to be made to Monsieur Monnet's approach". Secondly -
" ... there could be no question of the United Kingdom giving .up part of its 
sovereignty". And concerning the anxiety of the Norwegian Government whether 
"an agreement might have an effect on ... Norway's position as an importer of 
steel" Eden commented: " ... Her Majesty's Government would certainly not enter 
into any undertakings which would reduce healthy competition ... it would be their 
purpose to continue to have full regard to the needs of the United Kingdom's 
traditional customers. "47 
The negotiations between Great Britain and ECSC came to nothing. But the 
appointed committee on the Norwegian side continued its work and on 11 th 
October 1954 it concluded: At present Norway should not take any steps to 
achieve a closer association with the ECSC. If other countries, especially Great 
Britain, should seek a closer association with the ECSC, Norway's relationship to 
4S UD, 52.2123, Bind 8, "Questions concerning a closer association to the ECSC", 2.3 1954; 
UD, 52.2123, Bind 8, "NOlway's relation to ECSC", 15/3 1954; UD, 52.2123, Bind 11, 
"Norway's relation to the ECSC", 11.10 1954. 
4. UD, 52.2123, Bind 8, Report from Ame Skaug dated 19.3 1954. 
47 UD, 52.2123 Bind 8, Account from a discussion between Lange and Eden - dated 19.3 1954. 
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the ECSC had to be brought forward once more." 
. On the whole the disadvantages were esteemed greater than the advantages 
for Norway, and general Political cOll$ideratioll$ did not prompt closer cooperation 
with continental Europe. But during the discussions about Norway's. relationship 
to the ECSC.we also find a growing awareness about the significance of the 
coming continental cooperation. 
It is therefore appropriate to end this section about the European Coal and 
Steel Community by underlining that Norway also on this oc<;asion, in.the early 
fifties, confirmed her Atlantic profile and her strong economical and political 
dependence on Great Britain.. And as we have shown above this really influenced 
Norway's choices when the Schuman Plan was announced. But the statement from 
Arne Skaug, Norway's OEllC ambassador, that "the continental cooperation is 
potentially of the greatest interest for Norway's commercial and industrial life"", 
foretells problems of adjustment as the Norwegian feeling 'of distance to the 
continent would have to coexist with growing economic dependence on the same 
continent. We are struggling with those problems in the Norwegian arena of 
politics today. . 
Conclusions 
Until· the middle of our century Norway was a very lukewarm European; 
occasionally Norwegian attitudes can be classified as even anti-European. The 
roots of this Norwegian "distance" to the European continent can largely be found 
in Norwegian opinions about Germany and German policy. Even at the times when 
Germany was of vital importance for the Norwegian economy, Norway, when all 
is said and done, adhered to Britain. 
Not only was Britain Norway's principal trading partner, the unspoken and 
outspoken alliance was also based on solid military, political and ideological ties. 
Bearing this in mind we can ascertain that the more or less smooth manoeuvering 
" UD, 52.2/23, Bind 11, ''Norway's relation to the ECSC - Report from inter-departmental 
committee", dated 11.10 1954 . 
•• UD, 52.2/23, Bind 10, Report from Ame Skaug, dated 7.71954. 
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between Britain and Gennany, from 1905 until 1940, was not resumed after the 
Second World War. Soon the Atlantic states and particularly Britain became 
Norway's first choice when we speak about alliance alternatives. Gennany and the 
continent were respectively renounced as a partner and as a geografic frame of 
cooperation. And even if some voices were heard extolling the continental 
cooperation exemplified by the European Coal and Steel Community, the basic 
sceptical attitude survived and is still very much alive in many quarters in Norway 
at the present time. 
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